It would be difficult to find anyone treated more unjustly and superficially by historians than Austrian Chancellor Klemens Wenzel Lothar Nepomuk Prince von Metternich-Winneburg (1773–1859). The scholarly value of numerous historical works on this man and his accomplishments has been marred by the biased attitudes of their authors, their unwillingness to study primary sources, and, therefore, their surprising inclination to adopt many myths and superficial assessments of this statesman.

Without exaggeration, no biography has been written on Metternich that meets such high standards of historical scholarship as the publication of Wolfram Siemann’s voluminous monograph published by C.H. Beck in 2016. Around 30 biographies noted by Siemann for the period from 1836 to 2016 (p. 17) have suffered from the problems mentioned above: their authors were anything but impartial, and all of them based their works on a highly limited number of primary sources: they usually compiled source material from older books and articles and interspersed their texts with some letters from the eight volumes of Metternich’s correspondence published by his son Richard in the 1880s, or with some other volumes of the published correspondence of Metternich’s collaborators and other contemporaries. This was also the case of the hitherto most important biography published by Heinrich von Srbik1 during the interwar period, predominantly written upon secondary sources and being of questionable scholarly value as excellently explained by Siemann in the introductory part of his major work (pp. 21–30).

This genuine scholarly debacle in the research on Metternich is connected not only with the biographies written on his life but also many other works covering the period of the first half of the 19th century. The armies of historians influenced by both their personal dislike of Metternich and, usually, their simultaneous aversion to any impartial research of primary sources contributed significantly to the negative picture of this man as introduced to successive generations since the mid-19th century until the present day.

All the more important is the biography recently presented by Wolfram Siemann who has avoided the crucial mistakes committed by the majority of his predecessors: partiality and the lack of interest in archival sources. He has taken the lead of a small army of historians who also believe in higher standards of historical scholarship and with the use of a vast extent of never published sources have tried to depict Metternich in a way that revises many legends and imputations. In this respect historians like Robert D. Billinger Jr., Enno E. Kraehe, Alan J. Reinerman, and (somewhat immodestly) Miroslav Šedivý2 with their contributions on Metternich’s German, Italian and Near Eastern policies must be mentioned here since it is no coincidence that their findings generally correspond with those of Wolfram Siemann. However, it is the latter who deserves the greatest merit for assuming responsibility for the gigantic task of presenting a general survey of Metternich’s life and for doing so in such a highly respectable way.

Siemann’s book is by far the best biography of Metternich for three principal reasons. First, it is based upon a thorough research of primary sources. Besides the considerable number of those published, he also explored the archival sources to an extent never seen in biographical surveys on the Austrian statesman. Siemann is the first historian to have studied more than 500 boxes of documents on Metternich and his family housed in the Czech National Archives in Prague, as well as those relating to Metternich’s domains in Plass and Königswart in the archives in Pilsen, the archival sources and books in the Chateaus of Königswart and Johannisberg, Ficquelmont’s papers in Tetschen (Děčín), and of course the volumes of documents in the Austrian State Archives in Vienna.

Second, the gathered information, to an extraordinary extent, has enabled Siemann to provide new facts, refute old myths, avoid many stereotypes and, finally, offer a compact, extensive, impartial, and in many cases original survey of Metternich’s life. For example, the research of family papers in Prague has helped him to offer an excellent insight into the history of the Metternich family and therefore explain Klemens’ origin, youth, education, family connections and the sources of his wealth. Then, chapter after chapter in a well-structured book, Siemann is able to explain better than any of Metternich’s preceding biographers Metternich’s opinions and steps on the international scene as well as in Austrian affairs. From the book’s rich content two chapters must be noted here: the first on Metternich’s relations with women and the family members (pp. 544–606) that is an excellent example of the author’s detached view and dislike of a tabloid approach; the second on Metternich’s responsible and competent conduct in his own financial affairs and the management of his own domains, offering new and often surprising findings (pp. 736–763).

The third reason for the excellent quality of Siemann’s book is his deep knowledge of 19th century European history to which he has dedicated his whole long career. He has used it to great effect in putting Metternich’s life into the wider context of his period, which helps to better understand the role that Metternich played in various affairs and avoid simplifications and the repetition of deep-rooted stereotypes. This makes the book more than a “mere biography” of one statesman: it uses his life for the re-evaluation of the whole epoch. One example that must be mentioned here is the explanation of the reasons for the murder of well-known writer and playwright August von Kotzebue in 1819 by German nationalist Karl Ludwig Sand (pp. 662–674), which makes Metternich’s reaction more understandable than the black and white depiction of it that was usual in older historiography, portraying Sand as a follower of a progressive ideological and political movement and Kotzebue as a reactionary and Russian spy. In this respect Siemann does for Metternich the same that George S. Williamson did in his excellent article on August von Kotzebue by which he not only changed the perception of this man who was in no way a reactionary or a spy but, through the re-evaluation of the murderer and his victim, also significantly modified the reception of early German nationalism.3 Siemann in this respect convincingly proves that Metternich’s repressive measures in reaction to this assassination cannot be regarded simply as a black and white story with Metternich as the personification of reactionary evil but as a step undertaken at a time when Europe was plagued with political plots aimed at murdering important people and the destruction of the existing political order, a fear generally shared by contemporaries and simultaneously leading to similar repressive measures in the country most admired for freedom of speech: England. In this and other points, the introduction of Metternich within the wider context of the events and historical processes resembles Alan Sked’s recent inspiring book on Metternich4, but although the conclusions are in many points similar, Siemann’s work is more solid owing to more extensive sources of information.

The comparison of Siemann’s opus magnum with the above mentioned revisionist works predominantly dealing with Metternich’s steps in international affairs gives rise to a question of the Austrian chancellor’s general role in the European Concert as well as the European States System. In this respect Siemann’s Metternich is much similar to the one presented by Billinger, Kraehe, Reinerman and Šedivý: a keen conservative with no desire to adore blindly the past but merely to use the best from it for the creation of something new, in particular a post-Napoleonic stable and functioning European States System corresponding with the requirements of the given period and ensuring peaceful coexistence of all its members regardless of their power. Consequently, Metternich as introduced by Siemann is no reactionary but a kind of far-seeing architect of a new order based upon exceptionally intensive historical, philosophical and political contemplations evident already in his youth and leading to the formulation of legal-political principles with rational core and joined with pragmatic decision making if necessary. In his evaluation Siemann stands with the above mentioned gentlemen on a “scholar barricade” against rather shallow and predominantly negative assessments of Paul W. Schroeder and Matthias Schulz.5

Siemann’s latest monograph undoubtedly represents a turning point in the research on Metternich, showing that impartial research based upon the study of archival sources is absolutely necessary in connection with this statesman. There naturally still remains much to be done, especially with regard to the period of 1830–1848 to which Siemann pays considerably less attention than to the preceding decades of Metternich’s life, a fact that one can hardly criticise because then two volumes instead of one would be needed. In any case, Siemann’s book lays a foundation on which other historians can and must establish their examination of Metternich and his time.

Editorial Note: An overview of the review symposium on Wolfram Siemann: Metternich can be found here: http://www.hsozkult.de/text/id/texte-3886

1 Heinrich von Srbik, Metternich. Der Staatsmann und der Mensch, I–II, München 1925.
2 Robert D. Jr. Billinger, Metternich and the German Question. State’s Rights and Federal Duties, 1820–1834, Newark 1991; Enno E. Kraehe, Metternich’s German Policy, I–II, Princeton 1963/1983; Alan J. Reinerman, Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich, I–II, Washington 1979/1989; Miroslav Šedivý, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, Pilsen 2013.
3 George S. Williamson, What Killed August von Kotzebue? The Temptations of Virtue and the Political Theology of German Nationalism, 1789–1819, in: The Journal of Modern History 72 (2000), 4, pp. 890–943.
4 Alan Sked, Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation, Basingstoke, New York 2008.
5 Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848, Oxford 1996; Matthias Schulz, Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815–1860, München 2009.