Sehr geehrte Listenmitglieder,
hiermit stellen wir Ihnen Inhaltsverzeichnis und Abstracts des Aprilhefts der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte vor.
Ebenso möchten wir Sie auf den soeben erschienenen Band 86 der Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte hinweisen:
Ulbricht, Chruschtschow und die Mauer. Eine Dokumentation.
Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Matthias Uhl und Armin Wagner.
„Niemand hat die Absicht, eine Mauer zu bauen“, erklärte DDR-Staats- und Parteichef Walter Ulbricht am 15. Juni 1961. Kaum zwei Monate später wurde Berlin geteilt. Diese Tatsachen sind bekannt. Was sich aber vor, während und unmittelbar nach dem Mauerbau in Ostberlin und Moskau hinter den Kulissen abgespielt hat, blieb jahrezehntelang im Dunkeln. In der vorliegenden Dokumentation zeichnen nun Matthias Uhl und Armin Wagner die politischen und militärischen Planungen für die Errichtung des neuen Grenzregimes nach. Im Mittelpunkt stehen die Verantwortung für den Mauerbau, der Entscheidungsprozeß und die Rollenverteilung bei der Durchführung der Sperrmaßnahmen. Die hier präsentierten neuen Dokumente aus deutschen und russischen Archiven, darunter Akten der SED- und KPdSU-Führung, der Nationalen Volksarmee und des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit, fügen sich zu einem vielschichtigen Bild der Geschehnisse zusammen. Die Quellen werden von den Herausgebern in einer umfangreichen Einleitung kommentiert, welche den jeweiligen Anteil der sowjetischen und ostdeutschen Partei- und Armeeführungen am Mauerbau beleuchtet. Nicht zuletzt handelt das Buch damit vom Verhältnis von Fremd- und Selbstbestimmung in den Beziehungen der Sowjetunion zu einem ihrer wichtigsten Satellitenstaaten.
Andreas Kossert, "Grenzlandpolitik" und Ostforschung an der Peripherie des Reiches. Das ostpreußische Masuren 1919–1945
Andreas Kossert, "Borderland Policy" and Ostforschung on the periphery of the Reich. East Prussian Mazuria 1919 - 1945
For centuries the Eastern periphery of the Prussian Empire was home to a population composed several different ethnic groups. One of them, the Mazurians, succeeded in harmoniously integrating German and Polish culture. It was only with the rise of nationalism that both the Prusso-Germans and the Poles began to instrumentalise the Mazurians for their respective political goals. The resulting conflict reached its climax after the First World War, when Poland claimed that Mazuria was "old Polish soil". At the same time, the German home organisation started a vigorous campaign of "Germanization", which was officially termed a preventive measure against the "Polish threat". This campaign was ideologically supported by German scholars, who had devised the scheme within the framework of the so-called "Ostforschung". Along with a strong anti-Polish revisionist policy, Weimar historians established a vocabulary which undoubtedly helped to pave the way for future National Socialist ideas. Contemporary studies on the subject of Mazuria clearly mirror significant changes in the academic community before 1933 as compared to the time after. They also show that some scholars were personally committed to contribute to the final "Germanization" of the Mazurians.
Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg, Hitler, Göring, Mussolini und der "Anschluß" Österreichs an das Deutsche Reich
Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg, Hitler, Göring, Mussolini and the annexation of Austria to the German Reich
Analysing the specific example of the annexation of Austria to the German Reich in March 1938, this essay examines a question which has been controversially discussed for a long time: Was Hitler a strong dictator or not? The events of March 1938 are regarded as the prime example of a situation in which Hitler acted indecisively and as if he was controlled by external powers. Allegedly, it was not he who pulled the strings, but Göring, who drove Hitler, possibly against the latter's own will, into an offensive and violent course of action. This thesis, as it were an historiographical truism, is fundamentally questioned. Practically all available records are analysed; besides, both the National Socialist process of reaching decisions as well as the situation in home and in foreign affairs are closely examined. It is shown that Göring's part has been overestimated grossly and that Hitler remained master of his own decisions indeed.
Paul Maddrell, Einfallstor in die Sowjetunion. Die Besetzung Deutschlands und die Ausspähung der UdSSR durch den britischen Nachrichtendienst
Paul Maddrell, The occupation of Germany and the penetration of the USSR by British intelligence
The conquest of Eastern Germany by the Soviet Union in 1945 presented Britain with a threat to its security but also with excellent opportunities for gathering intelligence. Soviet exploitation of weapons factories and scientific and technical personnel in the Eastern Zone meant that Germans had knowledge of the USSR's armaments build-up; they could be recruited as spies. Soviet army officers and scientists could be exploited for intelligence if they defected to the West, which was much easier after 1945 than before. German prisoners-of-war used as forced labourers in the USSR's post-war reconstruction could be interrogated to find out what they knew about it. German scientists, engineers and technicians deported to the USSR in the years 1945-48 could, on their return to Germany, be interrogated for their knowledge of Soviet weapons development. So the main intelligence assets of Britain and the USA in the period 1945-61 were the division and exploitation of Germany; the two countries further increased the benefit they derived from these by sharing much of the intelligence which they gathered in Germany. Exploitation of these sources allowed the first intelligence penetration of the USSR to be made and also contributed to the later intelligence successes achieved by the U-2 spy plane and Corona satellite reconnaissance programmes.
Alexander Nützenadel, Wirtschaftliche Interessenvertretung in der parlamentarischen Demokratie. Die Debatte über den Bundeswirtschaftsrat in den fünfziger Jahren
Alexander Nützenadel, Representation of economic interests in a parliamentary democracy. The debate on the Bundeswirtschaftsrat ("Federal Economic Council") in the 1950s
In the years after the foundation of the West German State, heated debates arose upon the question whether a new constitutional body should be established in order to integrate trade unions and economic interest groups in the policy process. The project of a Bundeswirtschaftsrat was modelled on experiences in the Weimar Republic, where a similar institution had been intended by the constitution of 1919. The idea was supported by a broad coalition of different groups with strongly diverging motives: While Christian democrats such as Konrad Adenauer and Anton Storch were influenced by Catholic corporatism, conservative constitutional jurists such as Ernst Rudolf Huber and Erich Forsthoff were driven by a deep mistrust in parliamentary pluralism. The trade unions, on the other hand, expected to realize far-reaching economic and social transformations ("economic democracy"), whereas the employers' associations hoped to gain influence on the political process and to control wage development in the booming West German economy. Diverging expectations and a strong opposition by the Ministries of Economy and Finance prevented the institution of the Bundeswirtschaftsrat. In the course of the consolidation of the "economic miracle", corporatist policy models developed in the interwar period lost importance, whereas institutions of parliamentary democracy gained confidence in West Germany. Moreover, the influence of American concepts of scientific policy counselling became more important and supplanted the interest-based paradigm of economic policy.
Hansjakob Stehle, Geheimes aus Bonn für Moskau vom Vatikan. Der vielseitige Agent Monsignore Edoardo Prettner-Cippico und sein Nachlaß
Hansjakob Stehle, Secret information from Bonn for Moscow via the Vatican. A versatile agent and his bequest
Confidential reports by the pontifical nuncio in Bonn dating from the exciting period between 1966 and 1971, which are kept in the pontifical archives in the Vatican and which will not be available to the public for years to come, are to be found as carbon-copies in the bequest of the prelate Monsignore Eduardo Prettner-Cipico, who died in 1983. Prettner-Cipico, who was an archivist in the Vatican until 1948, worked as an informant of the "Office of Strategic Services" (OSS) during World War II. After a financial scandal, he was expelled from the clergy. Between 1963 and 1971, Prettner-Cipico obtained copies of hundreds of secret documents from former colleagues and sold them to a member of the Soviet secret service. He then worked for an American "information service" until 1980. The value of the copies which reached the Soviet Union was, however, limited, as the information which they contained on backgrounds, motives and intentions of West German politics was only partly correct.
Peter Sandner, Die Staatssicherheit und die NS-Forschung. Schlüsseldokumente zur Überlieferungsgeschichte der NS-"Euthanasie"-Akten gefunden
Matthias Uhl, Die Rolle der Streitkräfte der UdSSR und der USA sowie ihrer jeweiligen deutschen Bündnispartner in der Kubakrise. Eine Fachtagung der Instituts für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin am 15. Oktober 2002 in Berlin
Hendrik Bispinck, Das Markenzeichen des Sozialismus. Sozialpolitik der DDR als politisches und gesellschaftliches Spannungsfeld. Eine Fachtagung des Institut für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin am 3. Dezember 2002 in Berlin