The two decades after the end of World War II witnessed a seismic shift in world politics, with the swift dismantling of Europe’s Asian empires. By the early 1960s, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal had, for all intents and purposes, exited the region. Having granted independence to its South Asian possessions in the late 1940s and Malaya in 1957, Britain, too, was well on its way to liquidating its remaining colonial responsibilities in Asia. In 1961, the Macmillan government gave the green light to the creation of a Malaysian federation (established in late 1963), uniting the already independent Malaya with the British-controlled Singapore and the Borneo states of Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak. Colonial change in Southeast Asia coincided with Britain’s efforts to cut its cloth to its diminishing resources (and ambitions) and begin reevaluating its place in the world in the aftermath of empire. The radical redefinition of Britain’s regional role profoundly impacted its foreign relations, particularly those with its closest regional partners, Australia and New Zealand. Both countries still considered themselves British at the time and had strong connections with Britain through language, history and culture. In addition, they leaned heavily on Britain for their security (and prosperity) despite their “strong desire for American protection” (p. 35), as evidenced by the ANZUS Treaty of 1951, and their willingness to secure a long-term American military commitment to the defence of East Asia and the West Pacific. Unsurprisingly, Britain’s military retrenchment into Europe (along with London’s decision to seek entry into the European Economic Community) inflicted a significant shock on both countries, eventually leading to a major reorientation in their trade, foreign, and defence policies. Such was the jolt that in June 1967, the Australian Prime Minister, Harold Holt, candidly remarked to the British Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, that British actions made him feel as though “the world East of Suez could go to hell”.1
Maike Hausen’s “Reviewing Britain’s Presence East of Suez” skilfully assesses the political, psychological and strategic impact on Australia and New Zealand of the Wilson government’s decision in 1967–68 to withdraw British forces from Malaysia and Singapore (as well as the Persian Gulf), thus ending Britain’s military presence East of Suez. At the same time, it examines the implications of such a decision for Australian-British and New Zealand-British ties, providing a comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics at play. In doing so, Hausen capably recounts the tactics employed by Canberra and Wellington to prevent a British military disengagement from Southeast Asia and assesses both their merits and demerits. These tactics ranged from emotional appeals not to weaken the historical bonds uniting British nations to attempts to enlist American help to pressure the British government to stay the course in Southeast Asia at a time of significant regional upheaval. Hausen also vividly describes the expectations, assumptions and concerns of Australian and New Zealand policymakers responding to British actions. But, as her book makes it clear, Australia and New Zealand were not Britain’s only Commonwealth partners to be significantly affected by Wilson’s decision to pull out of Southeast Asia. Canada, too, reacted to this decision negatively, viewing it as another step towards the downgrading of Britain’s place and role in the world as well as of Ottawa’s relations with London. Like Australia and New Zealand, Canada “looked to Britain as a cultural, social and political model” and “shared values and common heritage” with it (p. 3). Although a British withdrawal from Southeast Asia would not jeopardise Canada’s defence posture in the region, for Ottawa lacked one, it did have an impact on Canadian interests in the region. Canada was concerned that London’s politico-military disengagement would undermine regional stability. However, in contrast to Australia and New Zealand, Canada was in a much better position to weather the East of Suez crisis. Not only did it have “a strong Atlantic outlook” (p. 278) and was “integrated into the security alliance of NATO” (p. 33), but it could also safely shelter under America’s security umbrella.
Despite the British and Australian dimensions of the story being well-known by now, “Reviewing Britain’s Presence East of Suez”’s originality lies in its in-depth exploration of how New Zealand and Canada reacted to the British withdrawal and how their reactions intersected with those of Australia. As Hausen correctly points out, hers is the first study to “review all three dominions’ foreign policy with a focus on security discussions on Britain’s role in Southeast Asia at Empire’s end” (p. 12). She does so by outlining the nature of Britain’s relations with the three old dominions in the aftermath of World War II (Chapter 2); by discussing the latter’s reactions to Britain’s incipient reassessment of its world role between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s (Chapter 3); by delving into the British decision to withdraw from East of Suez and its political and security implications for the three Commonwealth countries (Chapter 4); and, finally, by examining their foreign policy reorientation in the 1970s (Chapter 5).
This comprehensive analysis, based on solid multi-archival research in Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand and an excellent command of the relevant secondary literature, makes a significant contribution to the study of Britain’s end of empire and its repercussions for Commonwealth countries like Australia, New Zealand and Canada. As such, it is a much-welcomed addition to the existing historiography on Commonwealth relations, providing a fresh perspective and new insights into the twilight of Britain’s politico-military presence in Southeast Asia, as well as the unravelling of Britain’s close ties with its erstwhile dominions.
Note:
1 The United Kingdom National Archives, PREM 13/1323, Memorandum of Conversation between Denis Healey, Harold Holt and Allen Fairhall, 14.06.1967.