In 2005, the WHO published guidelines on outbreak communication. The aim of the guideline and the expert exchange that preceded it was to evaluate the communication strategies used during the first SARS epidemic in 2002/2003 and, building on this experience, to suggest “best practice” for communication in an emergency. More generally, however, the aim was to find ways of not only to respond communicatively in an emergency, but also to communicate the risk of the coming pandemic, which is assumed to be ongoing.
What structures are needed for successful communication, how to train people in advance to address the public in an emergency, and who should receive such training - these were all questions that were discussed in depth at a WHO workshop in Singapore in 2004, and on which concepts were then developed. Key issues were how to communicate ignorance or uncertainty, especially in the early days and weeks of a pandemic, without losing the confidence of the addressees, and more generally “to create an informed public, as good reporting translates technical information into lay language and can help the public understand the situation”. The fact that this could quickly lead to a situation in which “populations distrust their government and are suspisicous of its motives during an outbreak response“ was one of the main concerns of the assembled experts. Expected “setbacks and surprises” should be factored into communication planning from the outset.
However, not only the WHO, but also other institutions, such as governments, were quick to address the question of how to get their own message across, in an increasingly pluralistic public sphere – especially with the advent of the Internet in the 2000s - and how to persuade the population to behave in a compliant manner in the event of a pandemic. There were fears of an “infodemic” - an “infection” of the population with false information and rumours. The aim was to counter such an “infodemic” just as decisively as the pandemic, i.e. to assert control over communication, and thus gain and above all, retain sovereignty of interpretation over the risk associated with it. How was it possible to implement these preliminary considerations in the case of a pandemic such as swine flu or during the Covid-19 pandemic?
Our workshop will address precisely these questions from different disciplinary perspectives:
1. Thinking risk and communication together: Which social science and socio-philosophical theoretical approaches are suitable for developing a holistic approach to risk communication? What is actually understood as a risk, what determines which risks societies are willing to take - and which not?
2. Communication in pandemic planning: How did key organisations envisage communication in the event of an epidemic or pandemic? How did they plan to communicate with the public, policy makers and experts? How did their plans deal with the - renewed - “structural change of the public sphere” (Habermas) brought about by the Internet, which on the one hand made the transmission of (false) information much faster and on the other hand made everyone potentially not only a recipient of messages, but also a producer?
3. Communication during pandemics: How did communication in a pandemic - e.g. during the Covid pandemic, but other interesting cases would be the swine flu 2009f. or earlier pandemics - actually look like in the end? How were sceptics and critics of the measures dealt with in terms of communication and the media? What ways were sought (and perhaps not sought) to get one’s massage across? What was the rhetoric of the pandemic response to the public?
4. The recipients: Just as risks were and are not perceived in the same way by all people, so too do people respond differently to the communication efforts of public authorities. Why certain messages get through and others do not, which channels different social groups use to obtain information and instructions for action, and how risk and outbreak communication is processed by society are not only important for evaluating the success of communication strategies, but can also be understood as a probe for analysing social trust in the state.
5. Rumours, Desinformation and Conspiriacy Theories: However, communication is not and never has been a top-down process alone. In pandemics, communication also takes place outside official channels, and information is disseminated that does not come from official sources. In some cases, this is essential to provide information independent of, or in parallel with, official government communications. In its International Health Regulations, updated in 2005, the WHO also specified that information from such sources should be used and be the basis for developing a pandemic strategy. Which non-governmental communication processes have influenced government decisions, and which have been ignored by those in charge? Who is involved? How do official bodies try to channel or prevent these forms of communication? How are rumours and fake news generated and what are their functions?
The overaching objective of this workshop is to historicize risk and outbreak communication and to facilitate a dialogue between historical, sociological and public health approaches to the topic. This approach will enable a focus on both the ideas and expectations surrounding communication during an infectious event and an analysis of the implementation of communication strategies that have been pre-figured in planning processes, based on concrete examples (e.g., the swine flu and Covid-19). In this manner, the fundamental significance of risk and outbreak communication in the planning processes for a pandemic “risk future” (Graf; Herzog) as well as for coping with a pandemic can be elucidated and interactions and interdependencies between different groups of actors (e.g., between experts and the public) can be made visible.
The workshop’s interdisciplinary orientation and international comparative perspective represent a significant advancement in the field of risk communication research. The specific focus on outbreak communication will allow for a detailed examination of the broader field of risk communication in detail using a single example, thus producing concrete and comparable results.
In terms of content, the workshop builds on the organizers' research project, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG), which investigates pandemic planning since the 1990s. The topic of risk communication planning in the context of pandemic preparedness will be examined in greater depth, with emphasis on theoretical embedding and implementation.