Journal of Cold War Studies 22 (2020), 4

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Journal of Cold War Studies 22 (2020), 4
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Cambridge 2020: The MIT Press
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Journal of Cold War Studies
United States
The Editors Journal of Cold War Studies Cold War Studies Center 1730 Cambridge Street Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 Tel: 617-495-1909 Fax: 617-495-8319
Morawski, Paul

The Journal of Cold War Studies features peer-reviewed articles based on archival research in the former Communist world and in Western countries. Articles in the journal draw on declassified materials and new memoirs to illuminate and raise questions about numerous historical and theoretical concerns: theories of decision-making, deterrence, bureaucratic politics, institutional formation, bargaining, diplomacy, foreign policy conduct, and international relations.


Editor's Note

Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 1–3.;af=T


The Soviet Union, CMEA, and the Energy Crisis of the 1970s
Michael De Groot
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 4–30.
Numerous scholars have claimed that the Soviet Union was a primary beneficiary of the 1973–1974 oil crisis. Drawing on archival evidence from Russia and Germany, this article challenges that interpretation, showing that the oil crisis forced Soviet policymakers to confront the limits of their energy industry and the effects of the crisis on their East European allies. Demand for Soviet energy outpaced production, forcing Soviet officials to weigh their need to compensate for economic shortcomings at home against their role as the guarantor of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. The Soviet decision to raise prices within the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Soviet Union's inability to fulfill demand across CMEA compelled the East European governments to purchase oil from Middle Eastern countries at increasing world market prices, crippling their balance of payments and accentuating their other economic shortcomings.;af=T

Transnational Relationships between the Italian Revolutionary Left and Palestinian Militants during the Cold War
Luca Falciola
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 31–70.
This article examines the transnational ties between the Italian revolutionary left and Palestinian militants from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s. Some observers have cited these connections to explain the magnitude of Italian terrorism in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, in the absence of empirical research, the issue has remained murky. The archival sources and detailed interviews with protagonists used in the article shed light on this phenomenon by addressing four questions: first, the reception of the Palestinian cause within the Italian revolutionary left; second, the way Palestinian terrorist groups established roots in Italy and how the political context facilitated those efforts; third, the interactions between Italian and Palestinian militants both in Italy and in the Middle East; and fourth, the factors that strengthened or weakened the relationships between these entities. The evidence indicates that although Italian revolutionaries forged concrete ties with Palestinian militants and terrorists, these ties were not as extensively developed as some of the Italian leftists had hoped. The interactions encouraged radicalization but did not significantly foster violent escalation and terrorism in Italy.;af=T

Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan
Eitan Oren and Matthew Brummer
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 71–112.
This article discusses whether Japanese military and political elites perceived the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) as threats during the Cold War. Realist scholars have argued that Japan's security alliance with the United States and the global balance of power were such that most Japanese officials did not perceive either of the Communist giants as a serious military threat. Reaching a similar conclusion but for starkly different reasons, constructivist scholars have argued that cultural, normative, and identity factors explain why Japanese elites did not perceive the Soviet Union or China as militarily threatening. Neither of these arguments holds up. Archival data and oral history collections from Japan's Self-Defense Force and National Diet Library reveal that Japan's defense establishment and political leaders perceived both the Soviet Union and the PRC as extremely threatening and that these perceptions fluctuated in intensity over time, across sectors, and among actors. Psychological factors, including affect, behavioral tendencies, and cognitive beliefs (the ABC model), may better explain why Japanese judged the intensity and source of perceived threats in the manner that they did. These findings underscore why threat perception in the international system is best evaluated by aggregating individual judgments and their distribution among larger groups.;af=T

Private Enterprise, International Development, and the Cold War
Ethan B. Kapstein
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 113–145.
This article sheds light on the role of foreign direct investment as an instrument for economic development and, in turn, for the advancement of U.S. foreign policy goals during the Cold War. From the earliest days of the Cold War, and especially after the U.S.-Soviet competition for influence in the developing world began in the 1950s, the United States sought to promote private enterprise on behalf of U.S. goals. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, U.S. officials believed that foreign investment would suffice to fuel international development, obviating the need for official development assistance. These hopes, however, were largely disappointed. On the one hand, U.S.-based multinational companies preferred to invest in the industrial world; on the other hand, some Third World governments were uninterested in promoting private enterprise rather than state-led development. In part because foreign investment did not meet expectations, the U.S. government ended up elaborating an official foreign aid program instead.;af=T

NATO Enlargement and the Problem of Value Complexity
James Goldgeier
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 146–174.
Some of the recent literature on negotiations at the end of the Cold War regarding German reunification and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deflected attention from an important policy problem that arose during subsequent deliberations about whether to enlarge the membership of NATO. Newly released U.S. and Russian archival materials highlight this problem very clearly, namely, how leaders manage tradeoffs and uncertainty. Pursuing one set of interests can harm the achievement of other interests. At times, policies take a while to form, adding to uncertainty in relations between countries. This article highlights the ways U.S. President Bill Clinton and his top advisers convinced themselves that they could both enlarge NATO and keep Russia on a Western-oriented track, despite Russian President Boris Yeltsin's repeated warnings to the contrary.;af=T

The Sanctuary and the Glacis: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Nuclear Factor in the 1980s (Part 2)
Frédéric Bozo
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 175–228.
This is the second of two articles exploring efforts at bridging the nuclear weapons gap between France and West Germany during the final decade of the Cold War. This gap existed in various ways: in the two countries’ respective international standing, with the relationship between Paris and Bonn complicated by France's possession of nuclear weapons; in their alliance choices, with their differing approaches to NATO military integration and strategy; and in their tactical nuclear military options (inseparable from conventional options), with the two countries fundamentally at odds over desirable procedures. The first article, published in the previous issue of the JCWS, explores the period from 1981 to 1986. This follow-on article covers the years 1986 to 1990. Although ultimately the dilemmas of nuclear sharing proved impossible to resolve, progress was made in the final years of the Cold War in narrowing differences between the two countries, whose bilateral relationship has been crucial for Europe and the West as a whole in the post–Cold War era.;af=T

Gregg Herken
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 229–230.;af=T

Garret J. Martin
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 230–232.;af=T

Barnabás Vajda
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 233–234.;af=T

James Schroeder
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 234–237.;af=T

Paweł Machcewicz
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 237–239.;af=T

Jeffrey W. Knopf
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 239–242.;af=T

Kristie Macrakis
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 242–243.;af=T

Paul Josephson
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4: 243–245.;af=T

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Bestandsnachweise 1520-3972 E-ISSN 1531-3298