Themistius (ca. 317–379/380 AD) is known to us, and studied by scholars, under two different identities: (a) that of an orator and panegyrist, active in Constantinople at the court of four different emperors (namely Constantius II, Jovian, Valens – as Valentinian I’s co-ruler – and Theodosius I); and (b) that of a teacher of philosophy and a commentator on Aristotle. His orations are usually studied separately by historians and historians of literature in the context of late ancient rhetoric and the history of the Roman Empire in the fourth century AD, while his philosophical corpus (including, besides “paraphrases” of Aristotle’s works, personal treatises on several subjects) tends to be studied separately by historians of philosophy in the context of late ancient Platonism and Aristotelianism. Simone Mehr’s study falls within the first group, but it makes a commendable effort to take seriously Themistius’ self-presentation in his orations as a philosopher and to evaluate his philosophical stance therein not as a mere rhetorical figure but as the core of his speeches and the key to his remarkably successful and long career as a pagan encomiast of Christian emperors.
The book consists of an introduction (I) and four main chapters (II–V). Chapters II and III reconstruct, respectively, Themistius’ notion of philosophy and that of the emperor’s divine legitimation, while setting both in a larger historical context. Chapters IV and V, then, provide closer case studies of how the notion of divine legitimation is concretely developed in the specific historical contexts of Orations 6 and 7–8, respectively, with regard to three significant moments of Valens’ early rule. The book contains a brief index rerum & nominum as well as an index locorum.
Themistius’ success as an orator with four Christian emperors – and as a senator – has often been interpreted as an attempt on the part of the emperors to gain the confidence of the Eastern pagan elites attached to traditional Hellenic values. And Themistius’ pretension to speak as a non-Christian philosopher has been disparaged because he stays far behind the expectations for a pagan philosopher in the sense of, say, Jovian’s predecessor Julian (the Apostate). Mehr argues in Chapter II that both these judgments are based on a misconception of – or rather a lack of appreciation for – Themistius’ peculiar notion of philosophy. Building on earlier scholarly work, especially that of Gilbert Dagron and Dominic O’Meara, Mehr maintains that Themistius develops a concept of philosophy very different from the post-Iamblichean Neo-Platonism (with a central role ascribed to theurgy) embraced by Julian and apparently many of Themistius’ pagan contemporaries. One significant contrast pertains precisely to the role of the emperor who is emphatically not expected by Themistius to become a philosopher or engage in any theoretical activity. And no more is he expected to exhibit divine election by worshipping traditional Hellenic deities. Rather, taking advice from Themistius the philosopher, the emperor should manifest divine legitimation of his rule in virtuous action – that is, in good, philanthropic deeds.
In Chapter III Mehr brings out in more detail Themistius’ conception of divine legitimation of the emperor’s rule by a double contrast with Eusebius’ Laudes Constantini on the one hand and Julian’s pronouncedly pagan understanding on the other. Mehr emphasizes the fact that in Themistius’ account, the emperor’s virtue and goodness (showing that he was sent to earth by God) do not include any reference to specifically Christian dogmas or any kind of preference for practicing Christians, nor do they, of course, involve any attempt at reconstituting traditional Hellenic cults. In general, it is argued, Themistius’ novelty consists in dissociating the question of the emperor’s divine legitimation from religion and rephrasing it as an essentially ethical question. One may be surprised by the idea that a Christian emperor of the fourth century would embrace this novelty. But Mehr explains what the emperor apparently hoped to gain from Themistius. In inviting Themistius, with his religiously neutral concept of philosophy, to praise him, the emperor seems to have betted on Themistius’ ability to make this concept widely credible. In this way the emperor seems to have hoped to gain a much broader acceptance than either Constantine (via Eusebius) or Julian (on his own and via Libanius) could have dreamt of.
In Chapter IV Mehr focuses on how Themistius articulates (in Oration 6) his conception of imperial rule and its divine legitimation within the specific context of the unprecedented division of power between the two brothers – Valentinian I and Valens. In Chapter V, then, she analyzes the way in which Themistius navigates his ethical concept of divine legitimation in face of two critical moments for Valens’ early rule: the rebellion of the usurper Procopius and its aftermath (addressed ex post in Or. 7) and Valens’ engagement in the First Gothic War (a key topic of Or. 8, written for Valens’ quinquennalia). From the riches of motives analyzed in these two chapters (which would be impossible to sum up here), I single out Mehr’s observations about the much-discussed notion of philanthropia (characteristic not only of Themistius’ speeches but of fourth-century political thought in general). She helpfully describes how Themistius transformed the notion so as to make it attractive to both Christian and non-Christian elites (and applicable to an emperor lacking any proper education). Moreover, she explains how Themistius intended to cash out the value of philanthropia in the complicated context of the emperor facing a usurpation and potential opposition in its aftermath.
Mehr’s book is a highly informed and well-thought-out analysis of an important and apposite set of issues that are both central to Themistius’ activity as an orator and helpful for appreciating his unique place within fourth-century politics. Mehr opts (and argues) for a hermeneutical approach which starts from a meticulous analysis of a rather limited dossier of central texts (basically Or. 6–8) and shows what general insights these can provide when carefully and patiently examined within the larger historical context. In places, this approach occasionally makes for a somewhat arduous read with the main argumentative line not always being perspicuous, while some general points are repeated a little too often. But the reader’s effort is worthwhile. A potential regret on the part of the reader is that Mehr did not attempt to engage with Themistius’ more philosophical work and scholarly literature thereon. Themistius’ dependence on – and his polemic with – both pre-Iamblichean and Iamblichean Platonism is a well-studied question, many aspects of which are not reflected in the book. In particular, Mehr’s attempt to reconstruct Themistius’ markedly practical conception of philosophy could, arguably, benefit from taking into account other works, such as Themistius’ oration “On Virtue” (preserved in Syriac and translated into English by A. Rigolio in 2019 within the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series) which may be directly related to Julian’s Orations 6 and 7. But that may be a task to undertake in the future, especially as this treatise is now receiving more scholarly attention1, and there is a hope that the gap between the two groups of scholars studying Themistius’ two identities, respectively, will continue to be bridged.
Mehr’s monograph is a welcome contribution to existing scholarship and is recommended to anyone working on Themistius’ orations and/or the history of the Roman Empire in the fourth century AD.
Note:
1 See most recently Anna Marmodoro, Themistius’ De Virtute: Socrates’ virtue ethics ‘reconditioned’, in: Elisa Coda (ed.), The Power of the Words: Themistius on the Crossroad of Ages and Languages, forthcoming with De Gruyter.