Aufsaetze:
Johannes Huerter:
Die Wehrmacht vor Leningrad. Krieg und Besatzungspolitik der 18. Armee im Herbst und Winter 1941/42. [Abstract]
Konrad Dussel:
Kulturkonzepte im Konflikt. Britische, deutsche und schweizerische Hoerfunkprogramme waehrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs. [Abstract]
Hermann Wentker:
Ein deutsch-deutsches Schicksal. Der CDU-Politiker Helmut Brandt zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand. [Abstract]
Miszelle:
Markus Huttner:
Der Historiker als Gutachter im Strafprozess. Eine Replik auf Volker Dahms rechtspolitisches Plaedoyer "Freibrief fuer Rechtsextremisten?" [Abstract]
Dokumentation:
Andreas Wirsching:
"Man kann nur Boden germanisieren". Eine neue Quelle zu Hitlers Rede vor den Spitzen der Reichswehr am 3. Februar 1933. [Abstract]
Abstracts
Johannes Huerter, The Wehrmacht at Leningrad. The War and the Occupation Policy of the 18th Army in the Fall and Winter 1941/42.
With the siege of Leningrad by the Wehrmacht in September 1941, a 2 1/2 year period of intense suffering began for the people in that city and its surrounding regions. Hitler wanted to conquer and destroy this symbol of Russian and Bolshevik power, but because the German forces committed there were insufficient for the task, the 18th Army was ordered to seal off Leningrad from the outside world and starve its people to death. This terrible plan, combining National Socialist dogma with economic considerations, failed in spite of the countless deaths from starvation. Obviously incited by the extermination policy directed against the city the high command of the German occupying army also acted ruthlessly against Russian civilians living in areas surrounding Leningrad. In the fall and winter of 1941/42, the policy of the occupying forces consisted primarily in starving, expelling and exploiting. Although the army needed to keep prisoners of war alive in order to use them as laborers, it did not always do so. Driven by ideology and utilitarian consideration the army ended up with a policy of murdering the mentally handicapped in order to solve its supply and housing problems. For all these actions the army's high command bore full responsbility, while lower ranking officers and common soldiers did at times exhibit greater humanity.
Konrad Dussel, Conflicting Cultural Concepts. British, German and Swiss Radio Programs Aired during the Second World War.
While radio programs aired by the German speaking Swiss broadcasting service during the Second World War hardly differed from those before the war, those in Germany and Great Britain present a different picture. Because of wartime conditions, certain forms of entertainment, which before had been more or less rejected by those responsible for programs, began to be heard in both countries. These parallel developments show that it was not a need for propaganda, but a longterm international trend that was at work. It is a process which one could call the Americanization of european media which traditionally had been committed to education and culture.
Hermann Wentker, Helmut Brandt, a Human Destiny Caught between Accomodation and Resistance in the Two Germanys
When Helmut Brandt, a highly intelligent and talented lawyer and member of the newly founded CDU, became involved in politics in postwar Berlin, he became entangled in the Cold War. Opting for the East, though living in the West, in 1948, he and others founded the East Berlin section of the CDU and thereby contributed to the division of the party in the former German capital. Soon ousted from his post as chairman by openly pro-communist members of the Ost-CDU, he nevertheless continued his political career in East Berlin, because the chairman of the Ost-CDU, Otto Nuschke, convinced him that the Soviets wanted him for a post in an all-German government. In preparation for this, Brandt became Vice President of the Central Administration for Justice, and later, Secretary of State in the East German Ministry of Justice. The Waldheim trials, in which 3,320 Germans from the special camps in the Soviet Zone were secretly and unfairly sentenced, became the turning point of his life. He managed to gain access to the trials and persuaded Nuschke to protest against them in a government meeting in August 1950. Nuschke and Brandt got the backing of the CDU ministers, but their arguments did not convince the government. Now Brandt himself became a vicitim of East German justice. Arrested in September 1950, he was tried in 1954 and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Released in 1958, he was re-arrested 36 hours later while trying to flee to West Berlin. In 1964, the Federal Republic bought his release to West Germany. His past, however, made it impossible to resume a political career in the West German CDU.
Markus Huttner, The Role of the Historian as a Certified Expert in Court Trials. A Response to Volker Dahm's Article "Uncontrolled Right Wing Extremism?"
In contesting Volker Dahm's critical assessment of court rulings concerning the public use of National Socialist insignia (Kennzeichen), the essay shows that Dahm's analysis of recent acquittals of people wearing black triangular armbands similar to the ones used by the Hitler Youth is a misreading of Article 86a of the German penal code. In the jurisdiction of the last two decades, the legal term Kennzeichen was restricted to those insignia not only known to the people wearing them, but also to a wider public. Therefore the designation of insignia as illegal depends directly upon whether or not they can be recognized nowadays as Kennzeichen employed in the past by organisations since forbidden. The prevailing interpretation of Article 86a allows a broad application of legal sanctions against extremist challenges to public order. A wider use of particular insignia by extremist groups could affect their legal classification to the point that their public display might again be deemed a criminal offense. As questionable as Dahm's interpretation of the penal code is his notion of the role of the certified expert in court trials.
Andreas Wirsching, A New Record of Hitler's Address to Top Reichswehr Leadership on 3 February 1933
Hitler's address on 3 February 1933 in which he spelled out to the top leadership of the Reichswehr his longterm political goals has long been considered to be a milestone in the path leading to his seizure of power. In this essay, a recently acquired text of the speech is cited and evaluated. The original of this text, which had been stored in Moscow, came by way of the KGB to Ossip Pjatnitziki, then Chief of Organisation of the Communist International. The informant was most likely the daughter of Kurt Freiherr von Hammerstein-Equard, the Chief of Staff of the Army. This new text, which is more accurate and detailed than the two previously known versions from Kurt von Liebmann and Horst von Mellenthin, shows Hitler already outlining to the military leadership his "program" for "Germanizing" the still to be conquered land to the East by expelling its native inhabitants . This important new detail of Hitler's intentions will assist those doing research on National Socialist resettlement policy. Furthermore the attitude of leading figures of the Reichswehr who made no objections when informed of Hitler's program of terror appears decidedly questionable.